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 One of Spinoza’s apparent goals in the Ethics is to revise commonsense morality. This 
raises a question: do Spinoza’s revisions show that he thought morality was somehow unreal? In 
this chapter I argue that, despite his revisionism, Spinoza's metaethical views in the Ethics are a 
form of moral realism, even though they contain anti-realist elements.1  
In so arguing, I hope to bring Spinoza’s commentators and contemporary metaethicists 
into better conversation with each other. The terms “moral realism” and “moral anti-realism” 
entered the standard philosophical vocabulary only in the late 20th century, and many interpretive 
issues about Spinoza can be adequately discussed without using any contemporary metaethical 
categories. I hope to show, however, that attempting to classify Spinoza metaethically both raises 
important interpretive questions and shows that Spinoza’s views bear on various general 
metaethical issues. Many commentators, I believe, could benefit from closer attention to the 
details of contemporary metaethics, but contemporary metaethicists could also benefit from closer 
attention to the complexities of Spinoza's metaethics. 
 Metaethicists use the moral realism/anti-realist distinction to characterize a debate that 
supposedly goes back at least to Plato. I begin, therefore, by discussing the contemporary 
understanding of that distinction (§1), which has received limited attention from Spinoza 
scholars. I then survey common reasons for anti-realist readings of Spinoza (§2), before 
describing the moral realist elements of his views (§3). I then consider the metaethical 
significance of his revisionism (§4), and conclude by saying why, all things considered, Spinoza 
is best classified as a moral realist (§5).  
 A preliminary note: Spinoza himself does not explicitly distinguish between moral value 
                                                            
1 Anti-realist readings are more common than realist readings. For an overview of recent interpretations, 
see the introduction in Kisner and Youpa, Essays on Spinoza's Ethical Theory, pp. 3-12.  
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and other types of practical value (e.g. prudential value). This makes it harder for any isolated 
passage to decide in favor of a realist or anti-realist reading, since any given passage can be read 
in a non-moral way. Many of Spinoza’s readers have assumed, however, that at least some of his 
general claims about value apply to what we today count as moral value. I rely on that assumption 
below.2  
 
1. Moral Realism and Anti-Realism 
 
 In recent years, a number of Spinoza’s commentators have classified him as either a 
moral realist or anti-realist. Most of those commentators assume that the distinction is a 
straightforward one. In fact, the distinction between moral realism and anti-realism has been 
approached in at least three ways.3 These approaches focus either on (i) paradigmatic views, (ii) 
the truth of moral claims, or (iii) certain defining features of realism: mind independence, non-
relativity, and (occasionally) an opposition to egoism. These approaches are interrelated, but not 
equivalent. In this section, I briefly discuss each approach and note some complications involved 
in applying the realism/anti-realism distinction to Spinoza.  
In perhaps the most influential discussion of the moral realism/anti-realism distinction, 
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord writes, 
 
[t]he realism/anti-realism debate in ethics has been around ever since people began thinking 
critically about their moral convictions. The problem has always been to make sense of these 
convictions in a way that does justice to morality’s apparent importance without engaging in 
outrageous metaphysical flights of fancy. Some have thought it can’t be done; they’ve held that 
the apparent importance of morality is mere appearance. Others have thought it can be done; 
they’ve held that whatever metaphysics is necessary is neither outrageous nor fanciful.4 
 
In talking of “outrageous metaphysics flights of fancy,” Sayre-McCord probably has in mind 
Plato’s view in The Republic, which appeals to the Form of the Good. The Form of the Good (on 
the traditional reading of Plato) is something that exists outside the natural world and gives rise to 
knowledge, including moral knowledge, and to moral virtue. Plato illustrates the relation between 
                                                            
2 For one helpful discussion, see Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom, pp. 128-130. 
3 Some of the complexities in the moral realism/anti-realism distinction come from broader complexities 
about the general realism/anti-realism distinction. For one important discussion, see Wright, Truth and 
Objectivity. 
4 Sayre-McCord, Essays on Moral Realism, p. 2. 
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the Form of the Good and the natural world with the analogy of the sun, which exists outside the 
earth but gives rise to light and life.5 Plato’s view is a paradigm of moral realism. By contrast, in 
talking of those who hold that the apparent importance of morality is “mere appearance,” one 
view Sayre-McCord probably has in mind is J. L. Mackie’s. Mackie claims that all moral 
judgments presuppose a radical but false metaphysics like Plato's. He therefore endorses an error 
theory, according to which all (positive) moral statements are false.6 Mackie’s view is a paradigm 
of moral anti-realism. Other paradigms of anti-realism are the views of Hobbes, Hume, and 
Nietzsche. At the same time, some major figures in metaethics have a more controversial status, 
and their views are not clear paradigms of either moral realism or anti-realism. The most 
important such figure is Kant.7 One approach to determining whether Spinoza is a moral realist, 
therefore, would involve comparing him to various paradigms. Call this the Paradigm Approach. 
 Sayre-McCord does not ultimately use paradigms to define the difference between moral 
realism and anti-realism, however. Instead, he proposes that a view counts as a form of moral 
realism if and only if it says that (positive) moral claims (a) “when literally construed, are literally 
true or false” and (b) that “some are literally true.”8 Sayre-McCord seems to think that this 
approach correctly classifies all paradigmatic moral realists and anti-realists. If so, it would 
subsume the Paradigm Approach. Whether or not it does, this proposal (or variants of it) is 
probably the most widely-accepted way of drawing the moral realism/anti-realism distinction. On 
this second approach to the moral realism/anti-realism distinction, determining whether Spinoza 
is a moral realist would involve determining whether he accepts both (a) and (b). Call this the 
Literal Truth Approach. 
The Literal Truth Approach is not uncontroversial, though. One common worry is that 
moral anti-realists might be able to satisfy (a) and (b) using a ‘deflationary’ notion of truth.9 
Another worry, more relevant to Spinoza, stems from a third approach to the moral-realism/anti-
realism distinction. On this approach, moral realism crucially involves taking morality (i.e. moral 
facts) to have certain defining features that make it robustly ‘real,’ namely, that morality be 
absolute (i.e., non-relative), mind-independent, and perhaps also opposed to normative egoism. 
                                                            
5 See Republic, Book 6. 
6 Mackie, Ethics. The restriction to positive claims is needed, since an error theorist could agree that (e.g.) 
“love is not morally impermissible” is true. 
7 For a helpful discussion, see Kain, “Realism and Anti-Realism.” 
8 Sayre-McCord, Essays on Moral Realism, p. 5.  
9 See Dreier, “Creeping Minimalism.” 
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Sayre-McCord’s conditions, however, do not obviously require any of these defining features.10 
The most straightforward way to bridge this difference would be to focus on the “literal 
construal” part of Sayre-McCord’s proposal, and hold that a literal construal of moral claims 
requires taking them to refer to mind-independent, non-relative, and/or anti-egoistic facts. It is a 
difficult question whether that bridging strategy would be correct.11 Either way, if we took this 
third approach, determining whether Spinoza is a moral realist involve determining whether he 
takes morality to be absolute, mind-independent, and/or anti-egoistic in the relevant ways. We 
can call this the Defining Features Approach, though different versions of this approach would 
focus on different defining features.  
These three approaches might ultimately come to the same thing. Prima facie, though, 
they are quite different. It might be that no way of filling out the last two approaches draws the 
intuitive distinction between paradigmatic views. Moreover, the literal truth of moral claims 
might require none of the relevant defining features. We should be open to the possibility, 
therefore, that these approaches will yield different answers to the question of whether Spinoza is 
a moral realist. At a minimum, they suggest different argumentative strategies. 
Despite their potential differences, though, none of these approaches suggests that 
revisionism about moral concepts must imply anti-realism. Plato, a paradigmatic realist, was 
probably a revisionist of some sort. Non-philosophers, after all, would not think “good” could 
refer to an entity like the Form of the Good.12 In fact, for Plato, it could turn out that the only 
literally true moral claims were ones made using revised concepts (though, to be sure, there is 
some tension between literalness and revision).13 For similar reasons, it might be that the relevant 
absolute, mind-independent (and perhaps anti-egoist) facts for Plato are ones that are describable 
only by the revised concepts. Perhaps some revisions are incompatible with moral realism, then, 
but if so, the incompatibility is not straightforward. 
                                                            
10 For discussions of relativity and mind-dependence, see Findlay, “Four Faces” and Harman, “Moral 
Relativism.” For an argument that morality is opposed to egoism see Schopenhauer, On the Basis of 
Morals. As Nadler, “The Lives of Others” emphasizes, opposing egoism to morality is a largely post-
Kantian trend. Plato’s metaethics, for example, is not opposed to every kind of egoism. Nowhere I know of 
in the recent non-historical metaethics is egoism opposed to moral realism. Note that normative egoism 
does not straightforwardly imply mind-dependence or relativity. 
11 My own view is that such a strategy would be problematic. A deeper question is whether moral realism 
must concern moral claims at all. I discuss this issue in “Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral 
Realism.” 
12 See Annas, “Plato and Common Morality.” See also Theaetetus, 174c-175b on how philosophers’ views 
of value differ from non-philosophers’ views.  
13 As an example of literal truth with a revised concept, consider the literally true claim that marriage need 
not involve any property-exchange, even though the concept of marriage once did require property-
exchange. 
5 
I want to note three further things about the Literal Truth Approach in particular, given its 
importance in contemporary metaethics. First, Sayre-McCord’s proposal is not a stipulative 
definition. Instead, it aims to characterize a philosophical division that has been around “ever 
since people started thinking critically about their moral convictions.” Second, this approach does 
not specify whose moral claims are in question. It leaves open that the only true moral claims are 
those made by philosophers who revise commonsense moral concepts. This flexibility is needed 
for applying the distinction to views like Plato's. Finally, on the Literal Truth Approach, it is 
sufficient for moral realism if only a small fraction of moral claims are literally true. Moral 
realism could hold, on this approach, even if the vast majority of philosophers' and non-
philosophers' moral discourse were false, or not even truth-apt. This last feature may also hold for 
the other two approaches as well.14 
 In sum, then, there are at least three approaches to capturing the intuitive distinction 
between moral realism and anti-realism. To begin evaluating how Spinoza should be classified on 
these approaches, we can consider the grounds previous interpreters have offered for taking 
Spinoza to be a moral anti-realist. 
 
2. Anti-Realist Elements  
 
 Most discussions of Spinoza’s metaethics ignore the above subtleties concerning the 
moral realism/anti-realism distinction. Partly because of that, interpreters who read Spinoza as an 
anti-realist often simply assume one approach to the distinction, ignoring the others.  
My aim in this section is to summarize the chief textual motivations in the Ethics for anti-
realist readings: (1) Spinoza’s claims about the historical and psychological origins of moral 
notions and moral views, (2) Spinoza’s claims about the relativity of value and its connections to 
egoism, (3) Spinoza’s appeal to a model of human nature, and (4) Spinoza’s radically permissive 
views about natural rights.  
 
2.1. The origins of morality 
 
 Spinoza concludes Book 1 with remarks about how humans came to have moral notions 
and moral views. After describing how humans came to falsely believe that they had absolutely 
                                                            
14 There is an additional approach that occasionally surfaces in the metaethics literature (e.g. Street, “Reply 
to Copp,” 223): taking moral realism to posit an epistemic asymmetry between morally good and morally 
bad people. For reasons given in §3.3 below, this approach strongly favors counting Spinoza as a moral 
realist. 
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free will and that natural things had human-directed purposes, he states, 
  
[a]fter men persuaded themselves that everything which happens, happens on their 
account, they had to judge that what is most important in each thing is what is most 
useful to them, and to rate as most excellent all those things by which they were most 
pleased. Hence they had to form these notions, by which they explained natural things: 
good, evil, order, confusion, warm, cold, beauty, ugliness. And because they think 
themselves free, those notions have arisen: praise and blame, sin and merit. (E1app, G II 
81) 
 
Spinoza seems to be saying that humans’ moral notions arose from metaphysical mistakes. He 
does not say that moral claims are therefore false, but it would be a small step from what he says 
here to a Mackiean error theory. Sayre-McCord himself notes that “on some plausible 
interpretations,” Spinoza is an early defender of error theory.15 
 Spinoza’s claims about these notions after Book 1 generally sound less skeptical. 
Nonetheless, he gives an anti-realist-sounding account of moral judgments. In E3p9s, he writes 
that “we neither strive for, not will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be 
good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and 
desire it” (cf. E3p39s). To some commentators, this sounds like a mind-dependence-focused 
rejection of realism (denying a defining feature) that anticipates Hume's views (a paradigm anti-
realist).16 
 In a related vein, Spinoza holds that an epistemically superior being would not have 
notions like goodness and badness. In E4p68, he writes that “[i]f men were born free, they would 
form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free.” In 4p68d, he reminds us that 
free men live by reason and adequate ideas alone. That means the free man is epistemically 
                                                            
15 Sayre-McCord, Essays on Moral Realism, p. 10. See also Koistinen and Biro, Spinoza: Metaphysical 
Themes, p. 8 and Jarrett, “Spinozistic Constructivism,” p. 80. Spinoza tells similarly skeptical stories about 
ordinary notions of universals (see E2p40s1) and about common views about perfection (see E4pref). If 
moral notions concern universals and perfections, these passages could be read as continuing the error-
theoretic origin story from E1app. Alternatively, if Spinoza held that language is unable to express 
philosophical truth (see Savan, “Spinoza and Language”), he might be an error theorist about all 
philosophically-significant discourse, moral and non-moral. 
16 Garrett, “Spinoza’s Ethical Theory,” p. 287 thinks this remark suggests emotivism. Emotivism is a form 
of moral anti-realism that would involve rejecting both of Sayre-McCord’s conditions. Frankena, “Spinoza 
on the knowledge of good and evil,” p. 17 makes a similar claim about E4p8 (“The knowledge of good and 
evil is nothing but an affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it”). E4p8 is better support for 
an emotivist reading than E3p9s, for the latter can be read as a psychological claim without metaethical 
import. 
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superior to normal humans. The free man's lack of moral notions, one might conclude, indicates 
that those notions have no real bearing on reality. This suggests anti-realism on the Paradigm 
Approach, since it resembles the views of paradigm anti-realists like Nietzsche.17 
 
2.2. The relativity of value and tie to egoism 
 
 Spinoza does not dismiss all moral terms after E1app, but instead makes use of them 
himself in Books 3-5. This shows that Spinoza was not a straightforward error theorist. 
Nonetheless, much of what he says in Books 3 and 4 suggests a relativist, egoist approach to 
value. This has struck many of Spinoza's readers as showing that he accepted a form of broadly 
Hobbesian moral anti-realism. 
 Though the relativism and egoism in Spinoza's theory of value are linked, they have 
different anti-realist overtones. Consider the relativism first. In E3p39s, Spinoza uses “good” and 
“bad” as simple descriptions of joy and sadness. In the E4pref, Spinoza notes that these terms 
“indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than 
modes of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to one another.” He states, 
though, that he will retain these terms, and offers new definitions of them: “By good I shall 
understand what we certainly know to be useful to us” (E4d1), “By evil, however, I shall 
understand what we certainly know prevents us from being masters of some good” (E4d2).18 
 Two aspects of these claims suggest anti-realism, especially in accordance with the 
Defining Features Approach. First, there is the thought that anything relational or relative is not 
fully real. This thought appears in Spinoza's early writings.19 Second, even if relativism does not 
suggest unreality in all domains, one might think that relativism about value is opposed to 
specifically moral realism. For paradigmatic forms of moral realism like Plato's, for example, 
there is exactly one correct moral view. By contrast, Spinoza's relativist statements seem to allow 
for a wide range of equally correct moral views, provided that different things are certainly 
                                                            
17 On this comparison, see Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method, p. 128; Melamed, “Spinoza’s 
Metaphysics of Substance,” pp. 51-53. This point does not directly connect to the Literal Truth or Defining 
Features Approaches, since some non-relative, mind-independent facts (e.g. non-fundamental facts) might 
be ignored by epistemically superior beings.  
18 For a relativist reading of these claims, see Miller, “Spinoza’s Axiology” (but cf. Youpa, “Spinoza’s 
Theories of Value,” p. 222). Surprisingly, Spinoza continues to use the meaning of the terms described 
earlier in the preface later in Book 4 (see E4p65d). A number of commentators have thought Spinoza shifts 
between a commonsense view of value and his own theory (in particular, Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s 
Ethics, Chapter 12, though again cf. Youpa, “Spinoza’s Theories of Value”). 
19 See KV I 10, G I/49. 
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known to be useful to different creatures. 
 The “useful to us” in E4d1 points at the connection between Spinoza's egoism (traceable 
back to his conatus doctrine at E3p6) and his theory of value. Spinoza is explicit about this 
egoism, saying at E4p22c that self-preservation is the “first and only foundation of virtue.” In a 
letter to Willem van Blyenbergh, Spinoza acknowledges the radical implications of this view. He 
writes that someone “who saw clearly that in fact he would enjoy a better and more perfect life or 
essence by being a knave than by following virtue would also be a fool if he were not a knave. 
For acts of knavery would be virtue in relation to such a perverted human nature” (Ep23, G IV 
152). 
 Even though Spinoza's egoism is unlike Hobbes' in important respects,20 some 
philosophers have thought that normative egoism was incompatible moral with realism, 
regardless of whether it is coupled with relativism. Therefore, there is a case for classifying 
Spinoza as a moral anti-realist on either the Paradigm Approach or the Defining Features 
Approach. This case could be extended to the Literal Truth Approach, if we assumed that a literal 
construal of moral claims must be anti-egoist. The same might be said of the next two 
motivations for the anti-realist reading. 
 
2.3. The model we set before ourselves 
 
 When Spinoza states that he will retain the terms “good” and “bad” in 4pref., he talks of a 
model of human nature: “in what follows I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a 
means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature that we set 
before ourselves.” This model is not explicitly mentioned in E4d1 or E4d2, though most 
commentators take Spinoza's later discussion of the free man starting at E4p66s to be a 
description of that model.21 It is also plausible that Spinoza's discussion of value earlier in Book 4 
is made with the model in mind. While this issue is probably connected to Spinoza's relativism 
and egoism, Spinoza's reference to the model of human nature has played a distinctive role in 
motivating anti-realist readings.22 
 The idea that morality is based on a model we set before ourselves might, via the 
                                                            
20 See E4p36s. For relevant discussions, see Steinberg, “Spinoza's Ethical Doctrine,” Garrett, “Spinoza’s 
Ethical Theory,” pp. 302-05, Youpa, “Spinoza’s Theory of the Good,” LeBuffe, From Bondage to 
Freedom, Ch.5, Nadler, “The Lives of Others,” and Zuk, “Rethinking Spinoza’s Metaethics.” 
21 But see Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom, Ch. 8. 
22 See Jarrett, “Spinozistic Constructivism” and Rosenthal, “Politics and Ethics in Spinoza.”  
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Defining Features Approach, suggest anti-realism in two ways. First, it might suggest that 
morality is arbitrary. That is, it might allow that moral facts could have been different if we had 
chosen a different model, or that moral facts are different for different people because of their 
choice of models.23 These would seem to be forms of relativism, albeit relativism approached 
from a different angle than in E4d1 and E4d2.  
 The second anti-realist implication is subtler. Even if there were only one possible model 
of human nature, the appeal to a model would still suggest that moral facts are derived from facts 
about human choice and action. If morality is a human 'construction,' then it is mind-dependent in 
some way, and mind-dependence is a traditional mark of anti-realism. This might hold even if 
there were no arbitrariness, that is, even if morality could not have been constructed differently.24  
 In addition, if Spinoza’s model is the free man, then that model might not be fully 
attainable for actual humans, since actual humans cannot be completely free (see E4p4).25 This 
could add support to the anti-realist reading. For if morality is based on a model that cannot be 
real, then it might seem that morality itself cannot be real. The simplest way to formulate an 
argument along these lines would be to take the Defining Features Approach focus on reality 
itself (applied to moral ideals or models) as a crucial defining feature of moral realism. 
  
2.4. Natural right 
 
 Spinoza makes radically permissive claims about natural rights. The connection between 
natural rights and morality is complex, but a radically permissive view about the former would be 
more easily paired with moral anti-realism than with moral realism, especially if we reflect on 
certain paradigmatic anti-realists.  
 Spinoza’s best-known discussion of natural rights appears in Chapter 16 of the TTP, 
where he writes that since “Nature’s right is co-extensive with her power… each individual thing 
has the sovereign right to do all that it can do,” and that “the natural right of every man is 
determined not by sound reason, but by his desire and his power” (G III 189). Similar claims 
                                                            
23 Curley, “Spinoza’s Moral Philosophy” and Youpa, “Spinoza’s Theories of Value,” p. 217 read it as 
having this implication. 
24 Kisner, “Perfection and Desire” seems to take this kind of line (see also Kisner, Spinoza on Human 
Freedom, pp. 96-99 on subjectivism, Spinoza’s “irrealist conception of the good,” and the model). Aside 
from the Defining Features Approach, one could also reach this anti-realist conclusion from the view that 
only the fundamental is real (e.g. Fine, “The Question of Realism”). Note that the Defining Features 
Approach can come apart from the Literal Truth Approach here, if this human construction is compatible 
with the literal truth of some moral claims. 
25 For an influential discussion, see Garrett, “A Free Man Always Acts Honestly.”  
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appear in the Ethics: 
 
everyone, by the highest right of Nature, judges what is good and what is evil… avenges 
himself… and strives to preserve what he loves and destroy what he hates… in the state 
of nature… [one] is not bound by any law to submit to anyone except himself… [and] in 
the state of nature nothing is done which can be called just or unjust (E4p37s2) 
 
It is permissible for us to avert, in the way that seems safest, whatever there is in nature 
that we judge to be evil… we may take for our own use, and use in any way, whatever 
there is that we judge to be good… And absolutely, it is permissible for everyone to do, 
by the highest right of Nature, what he judges will contribute to his advantage. 
(E4app8)26 
 
Strictly speaking, these claims are compatible with realism about, say, goodness, provided that 
facts about goodness do not significantly limit facts about permissibility and natural rights. Yet 
Spinoza seems to think that goodness and badness are closely tied to natural rights. This is 
suggested by how Spinoza seems to ground both in the conatus doctrine. Since some 
paradigmatic anti-realists like Hobbes held similarly permissive views about natural rights, it is 
therefore easy to see why the passages concerning natural rights have struck some of Spinoza’s 
readers as evidence for him being a moral anti-realist.27   
 
 Assuming the above readings are correct, there are therefore reasons to call Spinoza an 
anti-realist. Some of Spinoza’s claims resemble those of anti-realists like Nietzsche, Hume, and 
Hobbes (Paradigm Approach); he seems to regard at least some moral claims as false, and others 
as at least not literally true (Literal Truth Approach); and he seems to regard at least some 
significant parts of morality as relative, mind-dependent, and egoistic (Defining Features 
Approach). The next question is whether there are realist elements in his views that could 
outweigh these anti-realist elements.  
 
3. Realist Elements  
 
                                                            
26 I have elided two clauses that weaken this passage’s anti-realist overtones. 
27 See Rosenthal, “Politics and Ethics in Spinoza,” whose argument also appeals to 4pref.’s model of human 
nature. Rosenthal thinks Spinoza posits significant constraints and norms via anti-realist means.  
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 While Spinoza expresses some skepticism about commonsense morality, he also suggests 
a commitment to vindicating morality in some sense. In E4p18s, Spinoza claims this his egoism 
provides the ground of virtue and morality [pietas]. Writing to Willem van Blijenbergh, he states 
that “the Philosophers . . . follow virtue not as a law, but from love, because it is the best thing” 
(Ep19, G IV 93). There is also the fact that the title he chose for his central philosophical work 
was “Ethica.” 
 At best, though, those points provide superficial evidence for the realist reading, not least 
because of difficult questions about the meanings of “pietas” and “ethica.” In this section, I 
describe three deeper aspects in Spinoza's philosophy that support counting him as a moral realist, 
namely: (1) Spinoza's Dictates of Reason appear to be prescriptive claims with a deeper 
metaphysical grounding than Kant's moral principles, (2) Spinoza identifies virtue with 
something robustly real, and (3) Spinoza posits something that closely resembles the 
paradigmatic (mind-independent, absolute) metaphysical posit of moral realism: Plato's Form of 
the Good.  
 
3.1. Kant and the Dictates of Reason 
 
 Like Spinoza, Kant sees morality as essentially connected to reason. As I noted above, it 
is controversial whether Kant should be counted as a moral realist or an anti-realist. What is 
relatively uncontroversial, though, is that Kant is a better contender for being a moral realist than 
either Hobbes, Hume, or Nietzsche. There is a case to be made, though, that Spinoza's view of 
reason is even closer to moral realism than Kant’s.  
 There are many readings of Kant’s metaethics, but one common reading takes him to 
make the following claims. The core moral principle is (or is expressed by) an imperative that 
arises from our faculty of reason. This faculty and its imperative cannot be changed by us. We 
have no genuine knowledge of the ultimate source of this faculty, and so cannot rule out that it 
has no deeper basis than our own nature.28 If reason had no deeper basis than our own nature, 
though, then it would follow that morality was mind-dependent in a certain sense. Such mind-
                                                            
28 In “Kant’s Derivation of the Moral ‘Ought’,” I offer an interpretation of Kant that makes the contrast 
with Spinoza clear. That interpretation takes Kant to see reason as a causal power that is also normative. 
For a related reading of Spinoza on reason and the Dictates, see Rutherford, “Spinoza and the Dictates of 
Reason.” Rutherford takes the Dictates to be non-prescriptive, however, because of the considerations 
described in §2.4 above and because of he thinks that reason cannot be both prescriptive and a causal 
power. Lebuffe, “Necessity and the Commands of Reason” argues that the dictates of reason are tenets of 
common sense, which the prescriptions of Book 5 are meant to go beyond. 
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dependence would at least partly align Kant with some paradigmatic anti-realists.29 
 In E4p37s1, Spinoza says: “[t]he desire to do good generated in us by our living 
according to the guidance of reason, I call Morality [pietatem].” In E4p18s, Spinoza describes the 
effect of reason on our actions in terms of a collection of ‘dictates.’ In these respects, he sounds 
quite close to Kant (see also the Kantian-sounding E4p72d).30 Unlike Kant, however, Spinoza 
holds that reason does have a deeper basis than human nature. Spinoza claims that reason is what 
provides us with knowledge “from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of 
the properties of things” (E2p40s2). Shortly before, in E2p40s1, Spinoza states that common 
notions are “the foundations of our reasoning.” E2p37-E2p40 show that common notions are 
adequate ideas of common properties of things, which are properties of all wholes and their parts. 
These common properties are, therefore, not human-dependent (nowhere in his discussion of 
reason does Spinoza appeal to anything like an arbitrarily-chosen model). By the parallelism of 
E2p7, then, the common notions are likewise not human-dependent (though see Grey, “Animal 
Ethics,” on E2p39).31 For Spinoza, therefore, the foundations of reason are not dependent on 
finite minds in the way that Kant seems to allow. On one important dimension, then, Spinoza’s 
views sound more like moral realism than do Kant’s. In accordance with at least the Paradigm 
Approach, there therefore is a case for taking Spinoza to be a moral realist.32 
 I should note one complication. The Dictates Spinoza lists at the middle and end of 
E4p18s sound like familiar parts of morality: “we ought to want virtue for its own sake… men 
who are governed by reason… want nothing for themselves that they do not desire for other men. 
Hence, they are just, honest, and honorable” (E4p18s). This shows that Spinoza’s pietas at least 
partly overlaps with our sense of morality, and shows that Spinoza’s revisionism is not extreme. 
The Dictates begin, though, with egoistic-sounding statements: “Since reason demands nothing 
contrary to nature, it demands that everyone love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really 
                                                            
29 For a relevant discussion, see Rauscher, “Kant's Moral Anti-Realism.” 
30 Another important area of similarity is the connections that Kant and Spinoza see between morality and 
freedom. See Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom, which also discusses how, for both thinkers, this 
freedom hinges on impartial and universalizable rules.  
31 They are, of course, dependent on God. But God-dependence is unlike human-dependence. In the TTP, 
Spinoza writes that, “divine commandments seem to us like decrees or enactments only so long as we are 
ignorant of their cause. Once we know this, they immediately cease to be edicts and we accept them as 
eternal truths, not as decrees, that is, obedience immediately turns into love which arises from true 
knowledge as inevitably as light emanates from the sun” (Annotation 34, G III 264, see also 1app). The 
mention of the sun here will be relevant below. 
32 One could object that Spinoza’s Dictates are not normative in the way that Kant’s are. Since Spinoza 
uses the language of “ought”s and “demands,” though, it is hard to see what would motivate this objection, 
though, besides a background assumption of anti-realism. 
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useful to him… the foundation of virtue is this very striving to preserve one’s own being” 
(E4p18s). While Kant has also been accused of a fundamentally egoistic morality,33 he never 
makes comparably egoistic claims. If, as some proponents of the Defining Features Approach 
might claim, egoism is inconsistent with moral realism, then, Spinoza may not be 
straightforwardly more realist than Kant. On the Literal Truth Approach, though, egoism 
threatens moral realism only if it challenges the condition that moral claims be literally construed. 
A similar complication applies to the next realist element of Spinoza’s philosophy. 
 
3.2. The Reality of Virtue 
 
 In E4d8, Spinoza identifies a central moral concept, that of virtue, with something clearly 
real: “By virtue and power I understand the same thing, i.e. (by E3p7), virtue, insofar as it is 
related to man, is the very essence, or nature of man, insofar as he has the power of bringing 
about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone.” In E4pref 
(following E2d6) Spinoza identifies reality with “the essence of each thing insofar as it exists and 
produces an effect.” Taking these claims at face value, Spinoza equates the virtue of a being with 
that being’s reality, since he equates each with essence-insofar-as-it-produces-effects. This 
appears to make part of morality robustly real, which suggests moral realism on the Defining 
Features Approach.34 Further, no paradigmatic moral anti-realist identifies virtue with a thing’s 
reality, so the Paradigms Approach also suggests moral realism here. Finally, these claims show 
that Spinoza’s views satisfy Sayre-McCord’s two conditions. Spinoza clearly takes some 
statements about power and reality to be true, and if virtue is definitionally identified with power 
and reality, then a case can be made that some statements about virtue are not just true, but true 
on a literal construal.  
 The last appeal to the Literal Truth Approach hinges on the assumption that if (I) x is 
definitionally identified with y and (II) some statements about y are true on a literal construal, 
then at least one statement about x is true on a literal construal. That assumption might be 
challenged, especially if the definitional identification involves a revision of the normal sense of 
one of the concepts being defined. This may be the case with the concept of virtue in E4d8, 
especially if it is part of the normal sense of “virtue” that it is opposed to egoism. For the power 
involved in virtue is the exercise of the conatus, which is the striving of a thing to persevere in its 
                                                            
33 Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morals, §7. 
34 On power and existence, see also E1p11d3. For a broadly similar argument, see Kisner and Youpa, 
introduction to Essays on Spinoza's Ethical Theory, p. 7.  
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own being (see E3p6-7), and this sounds obviously egoistic. In addition, since the conatus is 
essential to our minds (E3p7), and the conatus for different minds can differ (most clearly, 
between species; see E3p57s), there is a certain sense in which E4d8 makes virtue into something 
mind-dependent and relative. I return to these complexities in §4 and §5. 
 
3.3. Spinoza's God and Plato's Form of the Good 
 
 Perhaps the most important element of Spinoza’s philosophy that suggests moral realism 
concerns God. I propose that the existence of Spinoza’s God is sufficient for the literal truth of 
what is arguably Plato’s central moral claim, namely, that there is a Form of the Good.35 If 
Spinoza’s philosophy posits something similar to Plato’s Form of the Good (regardless of what 
terms Spinoza uses for that entity), then that would bring his philosophy very close to the main 
paradigm of moral realism. Here is an analogy. Say that some philosopher denies that God exists, 
but goes on to affirm the existence of a single supernatural being that created the universe, 
intervenes in the natural world in response to human petitions, and distributes justice in the 
afterlife. We might conclude that, despite her claims to atheism, that philosopher was in fact a 
realist about God. Analogously, I suggest, Spinoza has a Platonic moral metaphysics.  
 As with Kant, there are many different interpretations of Plato’s metaethics. Many 
readers, though, have seen moral realism in Books 6 and 7 of The Republic. In Book 6, Socrates 
claims that  “not only do the objects of knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their 
existence and being are also due to it; although the good is not being, but something yet beyond 
being, superior to it in rank and power” (509b). In Book 7, he claims that  
 
in the knowable realm, the last thing to be seen is the [F]orm of the [G]ood, and it is seen 
only with toil and trouble. Once one has seen it, however, one must infer that it is the 
cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that in the visible realm it produces 
both light and its source, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth 
and understanding; and that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it 
(517b) 
                                                            
35 As far as I know, none of Spinoza’s readers have considered the specifically metaethical significance of 
the similarities between Spinoza’s God to Plato’s Form of the Good. For recent discussions of Platonic 
aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy, see the essays in Ayers, Rationalism, Platonism and God. For background 
on Spinoza’s access to Neoplatonic authors, see Kristeller, “Stoic and NeoPlatonic Sources.” For a 
comparison of Spinoza with Plato (beyond just neo-Platonism), see Hart, Spinoza’s Ethics. Spinoza is 
critical of Plato on various points (see, e.g., Ep56), but not in ways that threaten the point I make here. 
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On the traditional reading of such passages, Plato is positing an entity that is:  
(i) the source of all other things,  
(ii) on analogy with the sun, the source of truth and the highest knowledge,  
(iii) known only with difficulty,  
(iv) a guide to virtuous action,  
(v) answerable to no higher standard, and  
(vi) radically unlike fallible finite agents in a way that is inconsistent with mainstream 
monotheism.  
One implication of this view is that people who act viciously must be ignorant of the ultimate 
nature of reality. 
 Spinoza never identifies God and the good, though he says knowledge of God is our 
highest good (E4p28). He was probably not directly influenced by Plato’s writings. Nonetheless, 
his God has these six features. Spinoza claims that:  
(i) God is “the immanent… cause of all things” (E1p18),  
(ii) “[a]ll ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true” (E2p32) and the highest kind of 
knowledge “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain 
attributes of God” (E2p40s2), on analogy with the sun (see TTP Annotation 34, G III 
264, DPP 1p15s),  
(iii) adequate knowledge of God is as difficult as it is rare (E5p42s),  
(iv) “[t]he good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other 
men; and this Desire is greater as his knowledge of God is great” (E4p37, see also 
E5p20),36  
(v) “[n]othing more absurd can be maintained about God” than that there is “something 
outside God… to which God attends, as a model” (E1p33s), and  
(vi) “the intellect and will which would constitute God’s essence would have to differ entirely 
from our intellect and will, and could not agree with them in anything except the 
name” (E1p17s), the heretical implications of which are obvious.37  
                                                            
36 Youpa, “Spinoza’s Model” argues that one of Spinoza’s models of human nature just is God. Hegel 
claims that the “great principle” of Spinoza’s system of morals was that “the finite spirit is moral in so far 
as it has the true Idea, i.e. in so far as it directs its knowledge and will on God, for truth is merely 
knowledge of God” (Hegel, Lectures, p. 275), so that there is “no ground for the objection that Spinoza’s 
philosophy gives the death blow to morality” (Hegel, Lectures, p. 279). 
37 One might object that Plato’s Form is intrinsically normative, while Spinoza’s God is not. This is a 
difficult issue, but since Spinoza does make God the source of reason (including the Dictates of Reason), 
there is a case to be made that God is intrinsically normative (cf. Mackie, Ethics, p. 40). See Spinoza’s talk 
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These fifth and sixth features make Spinoza’s conception of God closer to Plato’s Form of the 
Good than most other early modern conceptions of God.  
This comparison straightforwardly supports counting Spinoza as a realist on the 
Paradigm Approach, but yields arguments for the other two approaches as well. For Literal Truth: 
even if Spinoza does not claim that God is Plato’s Form of the Good, he easily could have (recall 
the analogy of the atheist). For Defining Features: none of the above six listed features of God 
involve mind-dependence or relativism, nor do they appeal to egoism. If we take Plato’s 
metaphysics to be a clear example of moral realism on the three approaches, then, there are good 
reasons to say the same of Spinoza’s.  
 
4. Spinoza’s revisionism  
 
I now turn to the metaethical significance of Spinoza’s revisionism about moral terms 
and concepts, which was touched on above. Spinoza’s makes his revisionist attitude explicit in 
Book 3: 
 
I know that in their common usage these words mean something else. But my purpose is 
to explain the nature of things, not the meaning of words. I intend to indicate these things 
by words whose usual meaning is not entirely opposed to the meaning with which I wish 
to use them. One warning of this should suffice. (E3da20expl, G II 195/19-24) 
 
E3da20 concerns “Favor” and “Indignation,” but, as the passages cited above show, it is hard not 
to see a similar attitude behind Spinoza’s definitions of moral terms.38 
 What this means is that while Spinoza’s system might imply the truth of some moral 
claims when literally construed by the standards of his own (or Plato’s) revisionist definitions, 
those claims might not count as true when literally construed by the standard of their unrevised 
meanings. At least at an extreme, such an approach can depart from the tradition of moral 
realism. If, say, someone re-defined “good” as equivalent to “carbon,” then they might be able to 
say something true with the sentence “there is good in everything that lives.” That, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
of moral precepts emanating from the divine nature at the beginning of Ep75. Another possible objection 
(suggested in correspondence by Matt Kisner) is that Plato’s Form is, unlike Spinoza’s God, transcendent. 
Since Plato’s Form apparently stands in causal relations to the world, this comparison is hard to assess. 
Regardless, transcendence by itself is not metaethically significant on any approach to the realism/anti-
realism distinction. 
38 For one relevant discussion, see Curley, “Spinoza’s Moral Philosophy.” For a helpful general discussion 
of Spinoza’s linguistic revisionism, see Laerke, “Spinoza’s Language.” 
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would hardly be a way of establishing moral realism. Spinoza’s revision is not as radical as the 
“good=carbon” revision. But the identification of virtue with power could be seen as a step in that 
direction.39 
 Nonetheless, this revisionism is by itself neutral on whether Spinoza is a moral realist. As 
noted above, none of the three approaches to moral realism preclude revisionism. There is good 
reason for this, since the paradigmatic realist Plato is almost certainly a revisionist. Moreover, 
consider the self-described ‘atheist’ from the previous section. Imagine that that philosopher 
offers a radically revisionist theological semantics, defining “God” as “largest quantity.” That 
philosopher then states, “God does not exist,” but continues to accept the existence of a 
supernatural, intelligent, benevolent creator. Despite her revisionist semantics, such a philosopher 
would still rightly be counted as a realist about God, whether because of her similarity to 
paradigm theists, her providing a system on which some theological claims would be literally true 
(albeit not on her semantics), or her positing an entity with the relevant general features. 
 
5. Realist or anti-realist? 
 
 We have seen that there are various realist and anti-realist elements in Spinoza’s 
philosophy, though all of those elements could be explored in further detail. Different elements 
suggested realism or anti-realism in different ways, according to the three approaches mentioned 
in §1. Given this complexity, one might be tempted to deny that there is any clear sense in which 
Spinoza is either a moral realist or an anti-realist. 
 Recall, though, that the point of the realism/anti-realist distinction is to capture a long-
standing debate in philosophy. Recall also that it is enough for moral realism (at least on the 
Literal Truth Approach) if even one moral claim, literally construed, is true. The claim in 
question does not even need to be one made by the philosopher under consideration. If any of the 
considerations described in §3.1-§3.3 hold, then this sufficiency condition is met, whether with 
“we ought to pursue virtue for its own sake,” “virtue is real,” or with “the Form of the Good 
exists.” In more general terms, my claim is that when determining whether some figure is a moral 
realist, we should weigh realist elements more heavily than anti-realist elements. This is, I think, 
a feature of the Literal Truth Approach worth taking seriously, and one that Spinoza’s 
commentators have not paid enough attention to. As an analogy: realism about dragons would be 
                                                            
39 Consider Spinoza on human freedom. Spinoza rejects human freedom in the ordinary sense (see E1app), 
yet later endorses a revised notion (see, e.g., E4p67d, E5pref). This would make it misleading to classify 
Spinoza as a simple realist or anti-realist about human freedom.  
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vindicated if even only a few dragons existed and most beliefs about dragons were false. We have 
enough, I think, for us to count Spinoza as a moral realist, even while acknowledging that his 
view has some anti-realist features.  
Regardless of how we classify Spinoza metaethically, though, I hope to have shown that 
the complexities of Spinoza’s views offer important challenges for figuring out what it would 
mean for morality to be real.40 
                                                            
40 Thanks to Paul Franco, Matt Kisner, Yizhak Melamed, Spencer Paulson, Mike Raven, Bill Talbott, 
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